Abstract. Py and Pypy are efficient array-based stream ciphers designed by Biham and Seberry. Both were submitted to the eSTREAM competition. This paper shows that Py and Pypy are practically insecure. If one key is used with about 2
Introduction
RC4 has inspired the design of a number of fast stream ciphers, such as ISAAC [8] , Py [2] , Pypy [3] and MV3 [10] . RC4 was designed by Rivest in 1987. Being the most widely used software stream cipher, RC4 is extremely simple and efficient. At the time of the invention of RC4, its array based design was completely different from the previous stream ciphers mainly based on linear feedback shift registers.
There are two main motives to improve RC4. One motive is that RC4 is byte oriented, so we need to design stream ciphers that can run more efficiently on today's 32-bit microprocessors. Another motive is to strengthen RC4 against various attacks [7, 11, 16, 5, 6, 12, 15, 17, 13, 14] . Two of these attacks affect the security of RC4 in practice: the broadcast attack which exploits the weakness that the first few keystream bytes are heavily biased [12] , and the key recovery attack using related IVs [6] which results in the practical attack on RC4 in WEP [13] . These two serious weaknesses are caused by the imperfection in the initialization of RC4.
Recently Biham and Seberry proposed the stream cipher Py [2] which is related to the design of RC4. Py is one of the fastest stream ciphers on 32-bit
The Specifications of Py and Pypy
Py and Pypy are two synchronous stream ciphers supporting key and IV sizes up to 256 bytes and 64 bytes, respectively. The initializations of Py and Pypy are identical. The initialization consists of two stages: key setup and IV setup.
In the following descriptions, P is an array with 256 8-bit elements. Y is an array with 260 32-bit elements, s is a 32-bit integer. YMININD = −3, YMAXIND = 256. The table 'internal permutation' is a constant permutation table with 256 elements. '∧' and '&' in the pseudo codes denote binary XOR and AND operations, respectively. 'u8' and 'u32' mean 'unsigned 8-bit integer' and 'unsigned 32-bit integer', respectively. 'ROTL32(a,n)' means that the 32-bit a is left rotated over n bits.
The key setup
The key setups of Py and Pypy are identical. In the key setup, the key is used to initialize the array Y . The description is given below.
keysizeb=size of key in bytes; ivsizeb=size of IV in bytes; YMININD = -3; YMAXIND = 256; s = internal_permutation [ 
The IV setup
The IV setups of Py and Pypy are identical. In the IV setup, the IV is used to affect every bit of the internal state. EIV is a temporary byte array with the same size as the IV. The IV setup is given below.
v+=d; } /* Now P is a permutation */ /* Initial s */ s = ((u32)v<<24)^((u32)d<<16)^((u32)P(254)<<8)^((u32)P (255) 
The keystream generation
After the key and IV setup, the keystream is generated. 
Identical Keystreams
We notice that the IV appears only in the IV setup algorithm described in Sect. 2.2. At the beginning of the IV setup, only 15 bits of the IV (iv[0] and iv [1] ) are applied to initialize the array P and s (the least significant bit of iv [1] is not used). For an IV pair, if those 15 bits are identical, then the resulting P are the same. Then we notice that the IV is applied to update s and EIV as follows.
for(i=0; i<ivsizeb; i++)
We call the first 'for' loop Algorithm A, and the second 'for' loop Algorithm B. In the following, we give two types of IV pairs that result in identical keystreams.
IVs differing in two bytes
We illustrate the attack with an example. Suppose that two IVs, iv 1 and iv 2 , differing in only two consecutive bytes with iv 1 
We trace how the difference in IV affects s and EIV in Algorithm A. At the ith step in Algorithm A,
At the end of the ith step, EIV 1 
. We obtain that s 1 − s 2 = 256 + δ 1 , where
, and x = ROTL32(s, 8). Then we look at the next step. 
At the end of this step, 
Thus after introducing the IV to update s and EIV , s 1 = s 2 and EIV 1 = EIV 2 with probability
Note that once an IV has been introduced in Algorithm A and B, the IV is not used in the rest of the IV setup. Thus once s 1 = s 2 and EIV 1 = EIV 2 at the end of Algorithm B, we know that those two keystreams will be the same.
Experiment 1. We use 2
14 random 128-bit keys in the attack. For each key, we randomly generate 2 16 pairs of 128-bit IV that differ in only two bytes: [7] . We found that 111 pairs of those 2 30 keystream pairs are identical. For example, for the key (08 da f2 35 a3 d5 94 e2 85 cc 68 ba 7e 10 8a b4), and the IV pair (6e e7 09 b1 35 85 2f 07 1a fe 3f 50 a8 84 30 11) and (6e e7 09 b1 35 85 2e 80 1a fe 3f 50 a8 84 30 11), the two keystreams are identical, and the first 16 keystream bytes of Pypy are (6f eb ca 18 54 3f 59 96 b6 17 8a 54 6e bd 45 1f).
From the experiment, we deduce that for an IV pair with the required difference, the two keystreams are identical with probability about The IV difference at two bytes. In the above analysis, the difference is chosen as iv 1 
. We can generalize this type of IV difference so that iv 1 [i] and iv 2 [i] can take other differences. As long as
, there is a non-zero probability that the two keystreams can be identical.
For example, if
, the two least significant bits of iv 1 [i] are 01 or 10, and iv 1 
, then two identical keystreams appear with probability 2
, then two identical keystreams appear with probability 2 −26.4 .
IVs differing in three bytes
In the above attack, we deal with the ith and (i + 1)th bytes of the IV, and use the difference at iv [ 
, and the most significant bit of iv 1 [i + 4] is 0, where i ≥ 2. We trace how the difference affects s and EIV . At the ith step in Algorithm A,
At the end of this step, EIV 1 
, and s 1 − s 2 = 0x8000 + δ 1 , where δ 1 is the difference of two different 8-bit numbers. Then we look at the next step.
, at the end of the (i + 2)th step of Algorithm A,
, and s 1 − s 2 = 0x800000 with probability close to 1.
Since
Then The IV difference at three bytes. In the above analysis, the difference is chosen at only three bytes, iv 1 In fact, once we set the difference as iv 1 
, then the two keystreams are identical with probability close to 2 −23 . For two IVs different only at three bytes, if [5] , then this IV pair is also weak.
Improving the attack
The number of IVs required to generate identical keystreams can be reduced in practice. The idea is to generate more IV pairs from a group of IVs. For the IV pair with a two-byte difference iv 1 [2] takes all the 256 values, then we can obtain 255 × 255 = 2 15.99 IV pairs with the required differences from 512 IVs. Thus with 512 chosen IVs, the probability that there is one pair of identical keystreams becomes 2 15 [4] and the eight bits of iv [5] choosing all the 512 possible values, while all the other 119 IV bits remain unchanged for each key (but those 119 IV bits are random from key to key). Then we obtain 255 × 255 = 2 15 For the IV pair with three-byte difference, a similar improvement can also be applied.
Experiment 3. We use 2 16 random 128-bit keys in the improved attack. For each key, we generate 512 128-bit IVs with the values of the most significant bit of iv [4] and the eight bits of iv [5] choosing all the 512 possible values, and the most significant bit of iv [8] is different from the most significant bit of iv [4] , while all the other 118 IV bits remain unchanged for each key (but those 118 IV bits are randomly generated for each key). Then we obtain 255 × 255 = 2
15.99
IV pairs with the required difference. Among these 2 16 Remarks. The attacks show that the Py and Pypy are practically insecure. In the application, if the IVs are generated from a counter, or if the IV is short (such as 3 or 4 bytes), then the special IVs (with the differences as illustrated above) appear with high probability, and identical keystreams can be obtained with high probability.
Key Recovery Attack on Py and Pypy
In this section, we develop a key recovery attack against Py and Pypy by exploiting the collision in the internal state. The key recovery attack consists of two stages: recovering part of the array Y in the IV setup and recovering the key information from Y in the key setup.
Recovering part of the array Y
We use the following IV differences to illustrate the attack (the other IV differences can also be used). Let two IVs iv 1 and iv 2 differ only in two bytes,
, and the least significant bit of iv 1 [i] be 1. This type of IV pair results in identical keystreams with probability 2 −23.2 . We first recover part of Y from Algorithm A in the IV setup (more information of Y will be recovered from Algorithm B).
Note that the permutation P in Algorithm A is unknown. According to the IV setup algorithm, there is 15 bits of secret information in P , i.e., there are at most 2 15 possible permutations. During the recovery of Y , we assume that P is known (the effect of the 15-bit secret information in P will be analyzed in Sect. 
From Algorithm A, we know
Thus we obtain
where ξ i is caused by the carry bits at the 24th least significant bit position when iv [i] and Y (−3+i) are introduced, and (4) holds with probability 1−2 −15 . From (1), (3) and (4), we obtain (P (B(s
where ξ i,1 = ξ i,2 with probability 1 − 2 −15 since the iv[i] has a negligible effect on the value of ξ 1 and ξ 2 . In the following, we use ξ i to represent ξ i,1 and ξ i,2 .
Denote iv θ as a fixed IV with the first i bytes being identical to all the IVs with differences only at iv 
Using another IV pair different at iv [i] and iv[i + 1], and the first i bytes being the same as iv θ , another equation (6) Generating the equations (6). The above attack can only be successful if we can find several equations (6) desired IV pairs. We call these 512 IVs a desired IV group. According to Experiment 2, this type of IV pair results in identical keystreams with probability We are able to recover s 
Since the two keystreams are identical, it is required that (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11) . In Sect. 4.1, there are about 7 pairs of IVs resulting in identical keystreams for each value of i. Thus P can be recovered completely.
We proceed to recover the key information. We consider the last part of the key schedule: (12) . Note that the randomness of ξ i does not affect the overall attack (once we guess the values of key [4] , key [5] and key [6] , then we obtain the other key bytes key[j] (7 ≤ j ≤ 15), key [0] , and all the ξ j (3 ≤ j ≤ 9 and 247 ≤ j ≤ 249). Thus these 14 relations are sufficient to recover the 13 key bytes. The effective key size is reduced to 3 bytes and these three bytes can be found easily with brute force search.
For the 32-byte key and 32-byte IV, 46 relations (12) 
The Security of Py6
Py6 is a variant of Py with reduced internal state size. The array P is a permutation with only 64 elements, and the array Y has 68 entries. Py6 was proposed to achieve fast initialization, but it is weaker than Py. Paul and Preneel has developed distinguishing attack against Py6 with data complexity 2 68.6 [19] . In the following, we show that identical keystreams are genereated from Py6 with high probability. There is no detailed description of the key and IV setups of Py6. Thus we use the source code of Py6 submitted to eSTREAM as reference. In our experiment, the following IV differences are used: iv 1 30 pairs with the original Py6 source code, we found that identical keystreams appear with probability 2 −11.45 . This probability is much larger than the probability 2 −23 for Py and Pypy. It shows that Py6 is much weaker than Py and Pypy.
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed practical differential attacks against Py, Py6 and Pypy: the identical keystreams appear with high probability, and the key information can be recovered when the IV size is more than 9 bytes. To resist the attacks given in this paper, we suggest that the IV setup be performed in an invertible way.
Several ciphers in the eSTREAM competition have been broken due to the flaws in their IV setups: DECIM [20] , WG [21] , LEX [21] , Py, Pypy and VEST [9] . We should pay great attention to the design of the stream cipher IV setup.
